Back to Exhibit 6

POINT A:  THE PETITIONER HAS PROVEN THAT HIS U.S.CONST. 6^TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED ON CASE NO. FVA-06241

FACTS:

1. The petitioner has a right under the 6^th Amendment to the United States constitution to be given a fast and speedy trial on any criminal charge allegations made against him.
    

2. The petitioner has proven through his petition for Habeas Corpus, Exhibits 1 through 11, and his affidavit (attached to this brief), that the State of California violated his said 6^th Amendment right to a speedy trial on case FVA-06241
    

3. The petitioner has proven that: on the date of 8-20-96 judge “Fettel” of the California Superior Court issued a warrant for petitioner’s arrest, case no. FVA-06241, for 6 alleged counts of Robbery and 6 alleged counts of false imprisonment. The warrant commanded that the petitioner be detained and brought to California “to be dealt with according to law” (EXHIBIT: 1; Affidavit of Justin Rueb (“Aff.”) ¶, 7). On the date of 1-21-97 the State of California sent a copy of this said warrant to the Adams County, Colorado, sheriff’s Dept. requesting that the petitioner be held for the State of California to face the said charges alleged in FVA-06241, and as result the petitioner was formally re-booked into the Adams County jail (when he had already been detained since 9-4-96) and held on $500,000.00 bail for this said California case (EXHIBIT: 2; Aff. ¶,8). The Adams County sheriff’s Dept. had “custody” of the petitioner at that time and the language of the said California warrant fit all of the requirements of “detainer”. (Aff. ¶,9).
    

4. The petitioner began his official “term of imprisonment” on 8-7-97 (for the purposes of the Interstate agreement on Detainers (I.A.D), which was the day petitioner was sentenced and finished with his last criminal case in Colorado (Aff. ¶ ¶, 10-11). The petitioner has proven that 8 days after his “term of imprisonment” began in Colorado, a head Adams County sheriff’s Dept. Administrator told the petitioner that California had again contacted them and requested that the petitioner be held to face charges on FVA-06241 (Aff. ¶,12).
    

5. The petitioner has also proven that several weeks later on 8-29-97, he filed a request with the said A.C.S.D. administration asking why California had still not came to extradite him to face charges on FVA-06241, and Administrator “Susan Andrews”, responded:” Your hold is still in place” (EXHIBIT: 3, Aff. ¶,12). Additionally the said warrant (which also constituted a “detainer”) was still active and lodged with the Adams County sheriff’s Dept. files and computers, and the warrant and hold demand were never withdrawn or vacated by the State of California, even after petitioner left the jail to state prison on 9-8-97 (Aff. ¶ ¶,13-14).
    

6. The petitioner also proved that upon arriving in prison, he immediately took the proper steps to demand a speedy trial regarding the still active warrant and “detainer” filed with the Adams County sheriff’s Dept. (EXHIBITS: 4,5,and 6), and that on 1-7-98 the proper Colorado Dept.of Corrections officials forwarded the petitioner’s demand for a speedy trial to the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s office (EXHIBIT: 7; Aff. ¶ ¶, 17 – 18). And finally the petitioner proved that even though California finally filed a SECOND “detainer” (EXHIBIT: 9), they still did not extradite the petitioner for trial within the 180 day time period to do so (under the I.A.D.) (Aff. ¶, 16-21), regarding the FIRST “detainer” (EXHIBITS: 1 and 2). Thus his right to a speedy trial was violated.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY:

7. There is no question as to whether or not the warrant sent to Colorado on 1-21-97, from the State of California (EXHIBIT: 1) requesting that the petitioner be arrested and held to face charges in California, constituted a “detainer” for purposes of the I.A.D.
    

8. The United States Supreme Court in the case of Fex V. Michigan, 113 s.ct. 1085,1087 (1993), defined a "detainer" as: ("A detainer…is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the petitioner be held for the agency, or that the agency be advised when the prisoner’s release is imminent.")
    

9. The term “request filed by a CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY…” means that a request for a prisoner to be held to face out of state charges, is not only applicable to requests by the district Attorney’s office, but it applies to ANY such request made by a “criminal justice agency”. This would include parole offices, judges, Sheriff Departments, or requests made by police departments, just to name a few. And also the language of Fex V. Michigan, supra, at 1087, makes it very clear that a “detainer” need NOT be made in any particular format (i.e. , on standard detainer forms) in order to CONSTITUTE a “detainer” for purposes of the I.A.D. ; otherwise there would have been no need for them to define what a “detainer”is.
    

10. The State of California has recognized this as well. See People V. Cella, 114 Cal.App. 3d 905, 917-18 (“A detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction…Although it is in dispute whether the WARRANT ABSTRACT was in fact ever lodged with the [prison officials], the district Attorney’s LETTER…, to the warden adequately satisfied the above requirements for a detainer.”) citing United States V. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359, 98 s.ct. 1834 (1978); see also People V. Rhoden, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1242, 1251 (1989) (The California Court of Appeals held that a letter from a distinct Attorney stating that “[ the defendant ] was wanted in California to face pending charges…contained the elements of a detainer” and held that a letter could constitute as a “detainer”.)
     
11. The Appeals Court in both People V. Cella, supra, at 917-18, AND People V. Rhoden, supra, at 1251, held that a letter requesting that a prisoner be held for out of state charges, constituted a “detainer”. There was nothing saying that a “detainer” has to be on any particular forms. Just a request or demand, in any form, is sufficient to meet the requirements of the I.A.D. And the court in Cella, supra, suggested that even a “warrant abstract” (such as the warrant that was sent in the case at hand) could constitute a “detainer” if sent to the holding state, by officials in the state demanding the hold (such as what happened in this case). The court held in People V. Rhoden, supra, at 1250 that: “For purposes of the I.A.D. a ‘term of imprisonment’ does not begin until all matters are concluded in the trial court, before and after pronouncement of sentence”. Id, at 1250.
     

12. The petitioner has proven that a “detainer” had been filed against him in Colorado from the State of California as far back as 1-21-97; that his “term of imprisonment” in Colorado (for purposes of the I.A.D.), began on 8-7-97 and that when the” term of imprisonment” began, the said detainer / hold from California was still in place; that on 1-7-98 the Colorado Dept. of Corrections forwarded the petitioner’s request for a speedy trial regarding this said “detainer” (for FVA-06241) to the California D.A.’s office; and that by the time California filed a second detainer and even EXTRADITED the petitioner on 9-18-98 to face the said California charges, the mandatory 180 days time frame to bring  petitioner to trial after his formal speedy trial demand, had already passed. Thus the petitioner has shown a prima facie case of violations of both: 1, his 6^th Amendment right to a speedy trial; 2, violations of the 180 day speedy trial right under the I.A.D. agreement, and thus for either of theses said reasons, or both, the petitioner’s conviction on FVA-06241 should be vacated and DISMISSED with PREJUDICE. “A prisoner entitled to the protection of the agreement who complies with the procedure set forth in Article 3, subdivision (a), must be transported to the jurisdiction where the charges are pending and tried on those charges within the 180 day period of limitations, or the charges must be DISMISSED and any detainer based thereon ceases to have effect.”

People V. Castoe, 86 Cal. App. 3d 484, 487 (1978) see also Tinghitella V. State of Cal., 718 F.2d 308, 312 (9^th cir.1983) (“Petitioner has a constitutional right under the sixth Amendment and the Due process clause of the fourteenth Amendment to have the California prosecution completed by imposition of sentence within a reasonable time.’) (Internal citation omitted).

13. Hughes V. District court, 593 P.2d 702, 706 (Colo.1979) (“There is no requirement in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers that a prisoner demonstrates that prejudice resulted from a violation of its provisions.”) Thus for all the said reasons above, the petitioner requests that the guilty plea  and conviction in FVA-06241 be vacated, and that said case be dismissed with prejudice, for violations of petitioner’s 6^th Amendment and 14^th Amendment right to speedy trial; and for clearly violating the speedy trial provisions of the I.A.D. agreement. ( “[A court] may entertain petition for writ of Habeas Corpus from prisoner incarcerated under consecutive sentences who claims that sentence  he is scheduled to serve in the future is constitutionally invalid.”) Peyton V. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 s.ct. 1549 (1968).